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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the strategic use of  trade 
policy  when  homogeneous  products are competitively  produced but 
their marketing is imperfectly competitive. This type of imperfect com- 
petition occurs in agricultural markets when state trading agencies or 
marketing boards are the sole marketing agents for products. It has 
also been hypothesized to occur in private trade of some agricultural 
products, but the extent of the market power of private traders is a 
highly controversial issue. Since the large USSR purchases of grain in 
the mid-1970s, the competitiveness  of the U.S. grain exporting industry 
has been highly disputed. Some have argued that high concentration 
ratios for the largest exporting firms indicate market power (Gilmore 
1982), while  others argue that arbitrage opportunities and frequent 
entry and exit of firms indicate a relatively competitive market (Caves 
1978; Caves and Pugel  1982; Thompson and Dahl  1979). 
This chapter focuses on how the presence of  state trading and the 
competitiveness of private trade affect optimal government policy. By 
examining a model in which a marketing board and private exporters 
are Cournot rivals in the world market for a competitively produced 
good, I  show that optimal  policy  is sensitive to both the manner in 
which marketing boards operate and the degree of competition in pri- 
vate export trade. The empirical  analysis focuses on the importance 
of state trading in the world wheat market. Since the United States is 
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the major private trader of wheat, I  examine the competitiveness of 
the U.S. grain export sector. 
There is a wealth of literature examining the implications of imperfect 
competition in agricultural markets, but most of it focuses on countries 
as units with market power and abstracts from issues relating to whether 
marketing is done by state agencies or trading companies.‘ The only 
study that examines the impact of marketing institutions on optimal 
government policy  is by Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman  (1979). They 
analyze a model in which a single marketing agent price discriminates 
between domestic and foreign markets and the government determines 
policy to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and producer sur- 
plus. They show that as long as the government does not regulate the 
domestic pricing of the agent and can subsidize domestic consumption 
and production, free trade is the optimal trade policy. This result is the 
same whether the marketing agent is a board that maximizes producer 
surplus or a monopoly-monopsonist  that maximizes profits.  If, how- 
ever, the government  forces a competitive price in the domestic market, 
it should tax exports of a marketing board and subsidize exports if the 
agent is a monopoly-monopsonist.  The major shortcoming of the anal- 
ysis is that it ignores the strategic interaction of firms and governments 
when more than one country exports a product. 
The “new”  literature on the strategic use of trade policy under im- 
perfect competition has, however, largely ignored the types of imper- 
fect competition  that can occur in  agricultural markets. Dixit (1984) 
and Eaton and Grossman (1986) note imperfect competition in distri- 
bution as a reason for imperfectly competitive trade, but recent models 
examining government policy have focused on markets with oligopol- 
istic producers. This is not surprising since the insights of these models 
are concerned with the potential for a government to shift rents toward 
its domestic market in industries with positive profits.  Agriculture is 
hardly a high-profit sector! 
However, if  governments frequently  intervene in agricultural mar- 
kets, and if one way they intervene is by creating state trading agencies, 
it is worth examining how these institutions affect the strategic use of 
policy. Marketing boards are common on both the export and import 
side of agricultural  markets; for example, several major exporters of 
dairy  products and grain  sell through  marketing  boards, and  major 
importers of grains, tobacco, and silk purchase through  such boards 
(Hoos 1979; Kostecki 1982). For OECD trade in thirty-four agricultural 
products for 1976, Kostecki (1982,26,286-88) estimates that 28 percent 
of exports and 27 percent of imports are accounted for by state trading. 
It is also clear from the emphasis on agriculture in the current GATT 
negotiations that government use of trade policy in these markets is 
not trivial. Table 4.1 presents post-Tokyo  Round trade-weighted nom- 81  Strategic Models and State Trading 
Table 4.1  Nominal Tariff Protection, Post-Tokyo  Round (1976)  by  Sector 
E  EC  Japan  U.S. 
Industry  ISIC  5%  Level  Rank  %Level  Rank  %Level  Rank 
- 
Agriculture, forestry, 






Furniture & fixtures 
Paper & paper 
products 
Print & publishing 
Chemicals 





Glass & glass 
products 









































































































































































Source: Deardorff and Stern 1986, tables 5.7-5.9. 
Nnre: The percentage levels are weighted by own-country imports 
inal tariff protection for twenty-two traded good sectors for the EEC, 
Japan, and the United States. Note that for the EEC and Japan, the 
agriculture, and food, beverage, and tobacco sectors are among the 
four top-ranked sectors. A ranking of export subsidies by sector would 
be difficult (particularly given the prevalence of indirect subsidies in 
both manufacturing and agriculture); however, the GATT code regard- 
ing export subsidies is more lenient for primary products (other than 
minerals) than for nonprimary products,* so direct export subsidies are 
more prevalent in agriculture. 82  Marie Thursby 
The models I examine are based on rivalry of marketing agents and 
governments of two countries exporting a homogeneous  good, pre- 
sumably agricultural, to a third country. In part, the motivation for the 
models is the widespread use of export subsidies in agriculture (World 
Bank 1986; Hillman 1978) and the recent result of Brander and Spencer 
(1985) that in the presence of imperfect competition, export subsidies 
may be welfare improving for the country imposing them. It is well 
understood that producers (in our case, farmers) stand to gain if  their 
governments increase their share of world  markets, ceteris paribus. 
The question of  interest in  light  of the Brander-Spencer analysis  is 
whether export subsidies can be welfare improving given the type of 
imperfect competition that occurs in agricultural markets. 
The models in this chapter are similar to the Brander-Spencer export 
rivalry model (1985) in that marketing agents play a Nash quantity game 
given government policies, but the governments can precommit to  these 
policies so as to give their agents a strategic advantage in world mar- 
kets. There are, however, several important differences between their 
model and mine: (1) production and marketing in our model are carried 
out by different agents, and in one of our countries, the marketing agent 
maximizes joint producer returns rather than profits; (2) there is do- 
mestic consumption in each exporting country, and governments can 
subsidize or tax domestic production and consumption as well as ex- 
ports; and (3) governments have the option of regulating prices charged 
to domestic consumers. The first and third of these are important be- 
cause they are common characteristics of marketing boards and their 
regulation (Hoos 1979), and the second is particularly  important for 
any model  of  agricultural  trade.  For many  products domestic con- 
sumption is a large portion of total sales, and government intervention 
in domestic agricultural markets is quite common (Brown 1986; Gard- 
ner 1986; Johnson 1973). 
These features of the models I consider are critical to the chapter’s 
contribution. A major theoretical contribution  of this analysis is to show 
that even when a good is sold by two marketing agents, an export tax 
or free trade may be the optimal government policy when the marketing 
agent maximizes producer returns and is regulated in its domestic price 
policy. This differs from the Brander-Spencer result that a subsidy is 
optimal when two profit-maximizing firms sell a homogeneous good in 
a third market. My results differ from the existing ones in the agricul- 
tural  economics literature  in  that I  show circumstances in  which  a 
marketing board’s government would optimally subsidize exports. The 
latter results hinge on introducing rivalry into the analysis. 
The second contribution of the chapter concerns the optimal policy 
of the government in the country that privately markets the good. A 
quasi-competitive model of private marketing is constructed to show 83  Strategic Models and State Trading 
that when a marketing board and private trading industry  with more 
than a few firms are rivals, it is unlikely  that the government of  the 
private trading country should subsidize exports. 
Finally, I present evidence on the structure of world trade in wheat 
to indicate the relevance of the models presented. 
4.1  Unregulated Marketing Board and Monopoly-Monopsony 
Consider a world in which a homogeneous good is exported by two 
countries to a  third  country that does not  produce it.  Each of  the 
exporting countries consumes the good, but because of  restrictions 
outside the model, they do not import it. One such restriction  could 
be transport cost, which, for simplicity  is assumed to be zero here. 
The good is competitively produced, and producers sell to a distributor 
or marketing agent rather than directly to consumers. In practice this 
might  occur because of  technological  features of transportation and 
marketing services, but, again, I  abstract from these here. The com- 
petitive producer supply curve is upward sloping. 
In each country there is a single marketing agent. In the home country 
it is a private monopolist and in the foreign exporting country it is a 
statutory marketing board. In both cases the agent handles all domestic 
as well as  foreign sales to consumers. The essential difference between 
them is their objective functions. The home monopolist is assumed to 
maximize profits, while the foreign marketing board maximizes the  joint 
returns of its competitive producers (farmers).'  Given its objective, the 
marketing board does not exercise monopsony power, but in the ab- 
sence of regulation, the monopolist does, since its marginal cost (outlay) 
for the good is higher than the competitive supply (producer) price. 
Throughout this  chapter the assumptions about marketing  agents 
comply with stylized facts from the world wheat market, which is the 
focus  of the empirical analysis in section 4.4.  Empirical models of wheat 
trade often treat Canada and the United  States as duopolists  since, 
together, they export roughly 60 percent of  world wheat exports. All 
Canadian sales of wheat are through the Canadian Wheat Board, while 
the United States exports are through private firms. In this section, I 
assume the private  export industry  is  a domestic monopoly,  but  in 
section 4.3 I consider a quasi-competitive  export industry  since the 
competitiveness of the United States grain export industry is disputed. 
With  only two marketing  agents, there is  no loss of generality  in 
restricting the analysis to a marketing board-private  firm rivalry. The 
policies  that would be optimal for the\government with a marketing 
board in this game would carry over (qualitatively) to a game with two 
marketing boards. The same is true for the government with a monopoly 
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As in Brander and Spencer (1985), the marketing agents are assumed 
to play a Nash quantity game in which they take as given the subsidies 
and/or taxes levied  by  their respective governments and the export 
sales of their rival. The exporting country governments can precommit 
to their policies so that they play a Stackelberg game against the mar- 
keting agents and a Nash game against the rival government. Unlike 
Brander-Spencer, the governments have three policy  instruments at 
their disposal: a consumption subsidy (tax), a production subsidy (tax), 
and an export subsidy (tax). All  subsidies or taxes are specific. This 
allows us to compare optimal policies  in this government game with 
those of Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman (1979). Throughout the chapter 
the analysis is partial equilibrium. 
4.1.1  Marketing Agent Equilibrium 
Let lowercase variables refer to home country variables and upper- 
case to corresponding variables in the foreign exporting country. The 
home country monopolist maximizes profits given by 
(1)  IT  = [d(y)  + r]  y  + [D,(x  + X)  + s]  x 
- [P(Y + x) - v I(Y  + x), 
where y denotes domestic sales, x export sales, d(.) domestic inverse 
demand, p(.)  the competitive  home inverse supply (producer price), 
D,(.) inverse demand for imports by the third country, and r,s, and v 
the home government consumption subsidy (tax), export subsidy (tax), 
and production subsidy (tax), respectively. A positive (negative) value 
for a policy denotes a subsidy (tax). The marketing board maximizes 
the joint returns of competitive producers in its country, given by 
(2)  n = [D(Y)  + R] Y  + [D,(x  + X)  + SIX 
- j-oy+xy(Y)  - VI 4. 
For simplicity let inverse demand and supply curves be linear and 
given  by  d(y) = a - by,  D(Y) = A - BY,  p(.) = f  + k(y + x), 
P(-)  = F  + K(Y + X),  and D,  = a, - b, (x + X),  where a,  b,  A, 
B, j-,  k, F,  K, a,,  and  b,  are positive.  The linearity assumption is 
consistent with the bulk of empirically estimated agricultural demand 
and supply equations. Other functional forms would not alter the major 
points of the chapter, although magnitudes of effects and assumptions 
required for uniqueness and stability of equilibria would differ. 
First-order conditions for the monopolist dictate that marginal rev- 
enue in each market equal marginal cost and are given by 
(3) 
(4) 
dddy = a  + r - 2by -  f  + v -  2k(x + y) = 0,  and 
&r/dx  = a,,  + r - 2b,x  - b,X  -  f  + v - 2k(x + y) = 0. 85  Strategic Models and State Trading 
Second-order conditions  are given by  -2(b + k)  < 0,  -2(6,  + k) 
< 0, and 4(b + k)  (6, + k) - 4k2 > 0. First-order conditions for the 
marketing board are given by 
(5)  dn/dY = A  + R - 2BY - F  + V - K(X +  Y)  = 0, and 
(6)  dII/dX = a,  + S -  2b,,X - b,x  - F  + V -  K(X +  Y)  = 0, 
with second-order conditions  -(2B  + K)  < 0, -(26,,  + K)  < 0, and 
(28 + K)  (26, + K) -  K2  > 0. As expected, the essential difference 
between the monopolist and marketing board’s first-order conditions 
is that the monopolist’s marginal cost reflects  its monopsony power 
while the board’s marginal cost is the competitive supply price. 
For given values of r, v, s, R, V, and S,  equations (3)-(6)  determine 
equilibrium consumption and exports of the two exporting countries. 
A convenient way to describe the equilibrium  is in terms of the two 
reaction functions, +(X)  and @(x),  which are derived by solving equa- 
tions (3) and (5)  for y  and  Y,  substituting into equations (4) and (6), and 
solving for x = +(X) and X  = @(x).  The reaction functions are 
(7)  +(XI 
b(a,  -f+ s + v) + k(a, -  a + s -  r) -  b,(b  + k)X 
2[b,,(b + k) + bk] 
,  and  -  - 
(8)  @(x) 
-  2B(a, -  F + S + V)  + K(a, -  A + S -  R) -  6,(2B  + K)x  - 
2[6,(2B + K)  + BK] 
where +’(@(x))@’  < 1 is assumed to ensure uniqueness and stability 
of the equilibrium. Equilibrium values of exports are (x’,  x*)  such that 
+(X*) = x* and @(x*) = X*,  and y* and Y*  are given by equations (3) 
and (5)  evaluated at x*  and X”. 
4.1.2  Government Policy Choices 
Following Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman (1979), I measure each coun- 
try’s welfare by the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus 
and net government revenue. Home country welfare is given by 
+ [a,, - b,(x + X)  + SIX -  ry - v(x + y) - sx. 
Recalling that each government plays  Stackelberg against marketing 
agents and Nash against the rival government, the home government 
is assumed to choose r, v,  and s in  order to maximize equation (9), 
given  the  behavior  of  agents and fixed  foreign policies.  First-order 
conditions for the home government are dwld7  = 0 for T = r, v, and s 
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(10)  = [a - by'](dy*/d~) 
- [f  + k(y* + X*)][(dy*/dT)  + (dX*/dT)] 
+ [u,~  - 2b,,,x*  - h,,X*](dX*/dT) - b,x*dX'/dT 
Using the monopolist's  first-order conditions, dwld~  can be written as 
(11)  dW/dT = [k(y* -t  X*) - V][(dy*/dT)  + (dX*/dT)] 
+ [by* - r][dy*/d~]  - [s(dx*/d~)  + b,p*(dX*/d~)]. 




r  = by* > 0, 
v  = k(y* + x*) > 0, and 
s  = -b,x*(dx*/dT)/(ax*/aT) > 0, 
where (dX*/d~)/(d~*/d~)  = -b,(2B  +  K)/[2(bm(2B  + K)  + BK)] = 
@'(-) for any T  = r, v, and .Y.~ 
While these choices of r, v, and s are not unique, they are the only 
choices of the three consistent with offsetting each distortion in the 
model at its source. Any other choices would necessitate targeting the 
export policy partially toward either the domestic consumption or pro- 
duction di~tortion.~  Hence we follow Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman in 
assuming that each policy is chosen to exactly offset the distortion at 
its source. To see that this is possible,  notice that v,  the production 
subsidy, enters both first-order conditions for the home exporter. If  v 
is chosen according to equation (13), the two first-order conditions are 
separated, and the consumption subsidy can be used to offset the do- 
mestic consumption distortion, while the export subsidy can be used 
to exercise market power abroad. 
The foreign country's welfare, W, is given by an equation analogous 
to equation (9), with the appropriate substitution of uppercase letters. 
That government chooses R, V,  and S  to maximize welfare given the 
behavior of marketing agents and fixed home country policies. Differ- 
entiating W with respect to T  = R,  S, and V and substituting from the 
marketing board's first-order conditions, the first-order conditions for 
the foreign exporting government can be written as 
(15)  dw/aT = -  v[(dY'/d~)  + (aX*/dt)l 
Welfare is maximized for 
(16) 
(17)  V  = 0,  and 
(18)  S  =  -b,X*  (d~*/d~)/(dX*/d~)  > 0, 
f [BY" -  R](dy*/d~)  -  [S(dX*/dT) + b,,,X"(&*/d~)]  = 0. 
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where  (d~*/d~)/(-dX*/d~)  = -b,(b  + k)/2[b,,,(b  + k) + bk] = +’(-)  for 
T  = R,  V,  and S. I maintain the assumption that policies are determined 
to exactly offset distortions at their source. 
The Nash equilibrium for the government policy game is character- 
ized by the first-order conditions for the monopolist and the marketing 
board, equations (3)-(6), and equations (12)-(14)  and (16)-(18).  The 
governments’ domestic policies are similar to those of Just, Schmitz, 
and Zilberman, and the export subsidies are positive as in the Brander- 
Spencer model without domestic consumption or a marketing board. 
This is not surprising since  I have targeted policies so that export policy 
need not be adjusted to offset domestic distortions. Domestic policies 
are determined completely  by  domestic distortions,  so  the optimal 
policies are no different in my model with export rivalry than in Just, 
Schmitz, and Zilberman’s nonstrategic environment. The government 
of the country with an unregulated  monopoly-monopsonist  will  sub- 
sidize domestic consumption and production, and the government of 
the country with a marketing board need not subsidize production but 
will subsidize consumption. 
The difference in my export policy and Just, Schmitz, and Zilber- 
man’s comes from the export rivalry. In Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman’s 
analysis, a single marketing agent supplies the world  market. Given 
the ability to price discriminate, this marketing agent exports the so- 
cially optimal quantity. With a Cournot export rivalry, however, each 
agent’s exports are a function of its rival’s exports. A government with 
the ability  to precommit  to an export subsidy  can use  that fact to 
improve  its country’s welfare, ceteris paribus.  Any  marketing agent 
(marketing board or monopolist) will export more with an export sub- 
sidy than it would otherwise. This reduces the exports of the foreign 
rival in equilibrium, hence increasing domestic welfare via an increase 
in  the marketing agent’s profits.  This is a key feature missing in the 
Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman analysis. 
4.2  Regulated Marketing Board and Monopoly-Monopsony 
The literature on strategic trade policy has focused on the impact of 
governments being able to precommit to taxhbsidy policies. But gov- 
ernments precommit  to more  than simple tax/subsidy  policies.  The 
market structures they permit and their regulation of industry involve 
a precommitment! In the previous section, I showed that a government 
precommiting  to a  statutory marketing board (to eliminate potential 
exercise of  monopsony power against producers) did not  affect the 
policy prescriptions for strategic use of trade policy. In this section, I 
show that this result is altered when the government with a marketing 
board  regulates  the  domestic pricing  of  the  board.  There are two 88  Marie Thursby 
reasons for doing this. One is to show that regulating the board in the 
hope of eliminating the need for a consumption subsidy is not as in- 
nocuous as  it might seem. The second reason is that it is not uncommon 
for governments to impose such rules on their marketing boards (Hoos 
1 979). 
Consider a game identical to the one in the previous section, with 
the exception that the marketing board maximizes joint returns of its 
competitive producers subject to the constraint that domestic inverse 
demand equals inverse supply, that is, D(Y) + R  = P(Y + X) - V. 
The regulated marketing board's first-order conditions are 
(19)  A+R-BY-F+  V-K(Y+X)=O,and 
(20)  a,  + S - 2b,X  - b,~  - F  + V 
- K(X +  Y)  + KBY/(B + K)  = 0, 
where use has been made of the constraint in obtaining equation (20). 
Notice the regulation prevents the marketing board from equating mar- 
ginal revenue in each market with  marginal cost. Moreover,  the last 
term in equation (20) implies that the board will export more than it 
would in the absence of regulation. 
The regulated board's reaction function is derived by solving equa- 
tion (19) for Y,  substituting into equation (20), and solving forX = Wx) 
given by 
(21)  V(X) = (q +  -  Ax)/u, 
where 
q = B(B + 2K)(a, + S -  F  + V), 
/.I,  = K*(u,  + S -  A - R), 
A  = b,(B  + K)*,  and 
u = 2b,(B  + K)* + BK(B + 2K). 
For given values of r, v,  s, R, V, and S, equations (3), (4), (19), and 
(20) determine equilibrium consumption and exports of the two ex- 
porting countries when the marketing board is regulated. Equilibrium 
exports in this game are given by (x#, X#) such that +(X#) = x# and 
q(x#) = X#s and equilibrium values of y#and Y# are given by equations 
(3) and (19) evaluated at x# and X#. +'(V(x))T'  < 1  is  assumed to 
ensure uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium. 
To  determine optimal policies for the foreign exporting government, 
we differentiate W with respect to T  = R, V, and S  and substitute the 
modified first-order conditions, equations (19) and (20), to obtain 
(22)  dW/dT  = -  v[(dy#/dT) f (dx#/dT)]  - R(dY#/dT) 
- [s  + KBY#/(B + K)](dx#/dT) - b,,  x#(dx#/dT). 89  Strategic Models and State Trading 
Welfare maximizing policy choices are 
R  = V = 0, and 
(24) 
where (dx#ld~)l(dX#/d~)  = +’(-)  is independent of the policy tool. 
The equilibrium  for this policy  game is characterized by the first- 
order conditions for the monopolist and the regulated marketing board, 
equations (3), (4), (19), and (20), and equations (23),  (24), (12)-(14) 
evaluated at x#, y#, and X#.  Qualitatively, the home government pol- 
icies are not affected by whether or not the board is regulated. How- 
ever, the optimal  trade policy  of  the foreign exporting government 
becomes ambiguous when it substitutes domestic price regulation for 
a consumption subsidy. The optimal policy is a tax if  the first term in 
S dominates, and a subsidy if the second term dominates. The reason 
a tax might  be appropriate is most easily seen in  Just, Schmitz, and 
Zilberman’s nonstrategic  case. In their model a regulated marketing 
board  would export too much from society’s point of view unless  it 
were taxed. This occurs because at the socially optimal level of exports 
the board could purchase an extra unit of the good at the competitive 
supply price, increase its domestic price by the increase in the supply 
price, and sell the extra unit plus the reduction in domestic consumption 
abroad. The first term in equation (24) reflects the fact that for a given 
level of home exports, the regulated board will export too much, while 
the second term  reflects  the effect of  the board’s  exports on home 
country exports in equilibrium. 
S  = -KBY#/(B + K) - 6, X#(dx#/d~)/(dX#/d~), 
4.3  Quasi-Competitive Home Market 
It is well known that optimal policy in oligopolistic trade models is 
sensitive  to the number of firms (Dixit  1984; Salant  1984; Krugman 
1987; Cooper and Riezman 1986), and it is natural to expect the same 
to be true here. The statutory marketing board is a clear barrier  to 
entry in the foreign exporting country,6 but unless barriers to entry are 
prohibitive in the home country we might expect more than one mar- 
keting agent even if  there are economies of scale in  distribution.  For 
that reason I examine a quasi-competitive model for the home country. 
This exercise is  motivated  largely because the competitiveness of 
the U.S.  agricultural marketing system has been a controversial issue. 
In the mid-1970s some sources claimed that the market was essentially 
monopolistic-monopsonistic,  and in response, several government, ac- 
ademic, and private studies have examined the issue empirically.  As 
is seen in section 4.4, even if  the U.S. agricultural marketing system 
is not purely competitive, it is clearly not a pure monopoly-monopsony. 90  Marie Thursby 
For that reason, it is important to know how sensitive the policy choices 
are to the number of firms in the home country. 
The simplest way to do  this would be to increase the number of firms 
in the previous two games. A more general model and one consistent 
(in a stylized fashion) with the example of U.S. wheat trade presented 
in  section 4.4 is one that allows two types of home firms: one that 
exports and  one that only  markets domestically  because of  a  cost 
disadvantage. In the limit the model allows the possibility of imperfect 
competition  in  the export sector, but  exporting firms are unable  to 
exercise monopsony power in the domestic market because of com- 
petition with firms marketing the good domestically.  In this section I 
examine optimal policy when the home market is modified to allow for 
this possibility. 
Suppose export marketing involves a distribution cost in addition to 
the producer price of the good. I abstract from whether this is a transport 
or information-related cost, and for simplicity we assume it is constant 
per unit sold. There are n  + h firms, the last h of which have a cost 
disadvantage  relative to the first n firms. Distribution cost, per se, in the 
domestic market remains zero. Profit for the ith firm is given by 
(25)  T~  = [a + r - b(yi + yi)]yi + [a,  + s - b,(xi  + xi + X)]xi 
- [f  -  v + k(xi + xi  + yi  + yi)](yi + Xi) -  cixi, 
where  yi  = Cyj 
j#  i 
and  *i  = EXj 
iii 
and ci  is per unit export distribution cost. Firms are differentiated only 
by this cost parameter, which for simplicity we assume to be low, cI, 
or high,  c2. For  i =  1, . . . ,  n, ci = cI,  yi = y,, and  xi = xl; for 
i = n  +  1,. . . ,n  + h, ci = c2,yi  = y2,andxi = x,. 




d.rrl/dyl = a  + r - (n +  l)byl - hby, -  f 
dn2/dy2  = a + r - (h +  l)by, - nby, -  f 
+ v -  k(n +  l)(y, + XI) -  hky*  = 0, 
+ v -  k(h + l)y, -  nk(yl + xI)  = 0, and 
(28)  d~r,/dx,  = a,  + s - (n + l)b,,&l - b,X  -f 
+ v -  k(n + l)(xl  + yI) -  hky, -  CI  = 0. 
The reaction function for a home exporter in this model is derived by 
solving equations (26)  and (27)  for yI,  substituting into equation (28), 
and solving for xI  =  +l(X).  Since exporting firms are symmetric, the 
reaction function for the home country export sector is n+,(X)  where 91  Strategic Models and State Trading 
(29) 
where 
+,m  = (a  + P - yX)/S, 
a = b(a, -  f + s  + v -  c,), 
P = k(a, - a  + s - r - clj, 
y = b,(b  + k), and 
6 = (n + l)[b,(b + k) + bklln. 
Notice that +,(X)  differs from +(XI only by the subtraction of c,(b + k) 
in the numerator and replacement of the number 2 in the denominator 
by (n  +  1 j/n. Domestic consumption in the home country is ny, + hy, 
where 
(30)  yl  = yz - kxl/(b + k). 
As we might expect, each exporter sells less at home than a typical 
domestic marketing firm. 
As before, the marketing board’s reaction function will depend on 
whether or not it is regulated. Denoting the marketing board’s cost to 
distributing exports by C, its reaction function if  it is unregulated  is 
given by subtracting C(2B + K)  from the numerator of the expression 
for @(x) in equation (8). If the board is regulated, its reaction function 
is given by subtracting  C[B(B + 2K) + K2]  from the numerator of the 
expression for q(x) in equation (21). Notice that because of the way 
Centers, it does not affect the slope of either marketing board’s reaction 
function. 
As before, optimal policies for each government are derived by dif- 
ferentiating the expressions for welfare with respect to policies and 
substituting from the relevant first-order conditions. The expressions 
for welfare differ from those in section 4.3 by the subtraction of the 
distribution  cost multiplied  by  exports. The equilibrium for a game 
between the home government and the unregulated board is now char- 
acterized by equation (29)  and the reaction function for the unregulated 
marketing board incorporating C and the following policies: 
(31)  r  = by;’, 
(32)  v  = k(y;* + x;*), 
(33)  s  =  -b,x;*(n[l  + @‘(*)I  - l), 
(34)  R  = BY**, 
(35)  V = 0, and 
(36)  S  =  -b,X**n+;(.), 
where superscript ** denotes equilibrium values for this game. 92  Marie Thursby 
Table 4.2 presents these policies and the policies from the previous 
games. Notice  that qualitatively  the foreign  exporting government’s 
policies are unaffected by the modification of  home market structure. 
Subsidizing both domestic consumption and exports remains optimal. 
The home government continues to subsidize both domestic consump- 
tion and production, but the optimal export policy is now ambiguous. 
It is a subsidy, free trade, or a tax as n is less than, equal to, or greater 
than  I/(]  + a’(.)).  Since a’(.)  is independent of any choice variable, 
this  result  is independent of the foreign  government subsidy  or tax 
policy.  In fact, since @’(*) E (-.5,  0), the existence of  two home ex- 
porting firms is sufficient for a tax to be optimal. 
Now consider the game with n > I  home firms and a regulated mar- 
keting board. The policy equilibrium is described by equation (29) and 
the regulated  marketing board reaction function incorporating  C and 
the following policies: 
(37)  r  = by##,, 
(38)  v  = k(y##, + x##,), 
(39)  s  =  -b,xf#(n[l  + V’(.)l - I), 
(40)  R  = V  = 0, and 
where superscript ## denotes equilibrium values for this game. 
Again two exporting firms are enough for an optimal export tax at 
home. And as  before, the invariance of the slope of the board’s reaction 
function with respect to choice variables makes this result independent 
of foreign policy.  As shown in table 4.2, optimal foreign policies are 








Monopol y-monopson y  r>O  R>O  r>O  R=V=O 
v>o  v=o  v>o 
s>o  s>o  s>o  sso 
Quasi-competitive (two  r>O  R>O  r>O  R=V=O 
or more exporters)  v>o  v=o  v>o 
s<o  s>o  s<o  sso 
Notes: Lowercase letters denote home government policies and uppercase denote for- 
eign. r > 0 (<  0) denotes specific consumption subsidy (tax);  v >  0 (<  0) denotes specific 
production  subsidy (tax); and s > 0 (<  0) denotes specific export subsidy (tax). 93  Strategic Models and State Trading 
qualitatively the same as those for the regulated board  with a home 
country monopoly-monopsony. Essentially the regulation of domestic 
price gives the board extra incentive to export, so the optimal export 
policy is either a lower subsidy than in the unregulated case or a tax. 
4.4  World Wheat Trade, State Trading, and Market Structure 
Each of the four models examined is characterized by the rivalry of 
two exporting countries with market power in international trade, where 
one of the countries exercises its power, in part, through a marketing 
board. Hence these models would apply to markets dominated by a 
few countries, at least one of which sells through a marketing board. 
One such market is the world wheat market. The combined exports of 
the two largest exporting countries,  Canada and the  United  States, 
comprise roughly 60 percent of world exports. The combined market 
share of the top four exporters is approximately 80 percent.’ 
Table 4.3 indicates the portion of world wheat exports either sold or 
purchased by marketing or state trading agencies for selected periods 
between  1963  and  1984.8 The table includes  exports of  the  United 
States, Canada, EEC, Australia, Argentina, and USSR. Exports of the 
Table 4.3  State Trading in Wheat (percentage of volume of principal 
exporters accounted for by  state traders) 
1963-67  I973 -77  1980-84 
(%)  (%)  (%) 
I. Private exporters to 
private importers 
2. Private exporters to state 
importers 
3. State exporters to private 
importers 
4. State exporters to  state 
importers 
5.  Exports by private 
traders  =  (I  + 2) 
6. Exports by state traders 
= (3 + 4) 
7.  Imports by private traders 
=  (I + 3) 
8. Imports by state traders 
= (2 + 4) 
Volume of trade (000 mt) 
Total exports (000  mt) 
5.9 
51.2 




























Sources; McCalla and Schrnitz  1982, table 3.5, for  1963-77  data; International Wheat 
Council, various issues, for 1980-84  data. 94  Marie Thursby 
United  States and EEC are private,  and after  1963-67  Argentina’s 
exports are private. Canada and Australia sell through marketing boards. 
The EEC is the only major importer that is private; the Western Eu- 
ropean countries other than the EEC have state trading agencies for 
wheat, and the Japanese import through the Japanese Food Agency. 
Although  their  market  shares are variable, the  USSR  and  People’s 
Republic of  China are large importers. 
Less than 6 percent of  the exports in table 4.3 is sold by  private 
traders to private traders. This trade represents primarily U.S. exports 
to the EEC and has been declining over time. Percentages in the second 
row indicate that over half of  the exports are sold by private traders 
to state importers.  These percentages reflect mainly U.S. and EEC 
exports. Rows three and four indicate the exports of  state exporters 
by their destination. Note that the sum of  these (given in row six) is 
roughly a third of  total exports. Finally, the sum of imports by  state 
traders ranges between 86 percent and 96 percent. 
4.4.1  Imperfectly Competitive Models of World Wheat Trade 
Market shares for the major wheat exporters have remained fairly 
stable over the past twenty years, with the exception that the EEC 
share of world exports has roughly doubled in the last decade. Because 
of the large and stable export shares, a number of studies have ex- 
amined oligopolistic models of the world wheat market (McCalla 1966; 
Taplin 1969; Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess 1978; Schmitz et al. 1981; 
Karp and McCalla 1983; Paarlberg and Abbott 1984; and Kolstad and 
Burris 1986). These studies have made a variety of assumptions about 
numbers of  rivals and the nature of competition among them. 
Perhaps the closest to the models developed here is that of Kolstad 
and Burris (1986) which is a spatial equilibrium trade model in which 
producing  country governments are Nash  quantity competitors who 
maximize profits and have the ability to price discriminate  between 
domestic and foreign sales. For  1972-73  trade flows, they  examine 
hypotheses of (1) a United States-Canada duopoly, (2) a U.S.-Canada- 
Australia triopoly,  (3) a Japan-EEC duopsony, and (4)  perfect com- 
petition. They find that the U.S.-Canadian duopoly comes the closest 
to predicting actual trade for that year.9 
These results suggest that a game between the U.S. and Canadian 
governments, with sales agents being the Canadian Wheat Board and 
U.S. grain exporters, is a useful abstraction. One of the major goals 
of the Canadian Wheat Board is to maximize producer returns, and it 
is the sole agent for both domestic and foreign sales of Canadian wheat. 
Since September 1973, the price it can charge domestically has been 
regulated (Schmitz and McCalla 1979), so its behavior comes closest 
to the regulated board in our models. The remaining issue as to which 95  Strategic Models and State Trading 
of the models would apply to a U.S.-Canadian duopoly concerns the 
competitiveness of the U.S. marketing system. 
4.4.2  Competitiveness of U.S. Grain Marketing 
A 1976 report of  the USDAs Farmer Cooperative Service claimed 
that the six largest grain exporting firms accounted for 90 percent of 
U.S. exports of grain (USGAO 1982). Estimates of concentration in 
U.S. grain exporting plus the controversial sales of grain to the USSR 
in the mid-1970s stimulated a series of studies of the competitiveness 
of this sector. 
Several of these studies were done by the General Accounting Office 
of the U.S. government. They focused on providing revised estimates 
of concentration in the export sector (USGAO 1982; Conklin 1982) and 
on the efficiency of futures markets for grains (Conklin 1982). Table 
4.4 presents GAO’s estimates of concentration ratios for wheat, corn, 
soybeans, and all grains.  Since many of the same firms that export 
wheat also trade other grains, we present evidence for other grains as 
well. Three characteristics are evident. First, the export sector is not 
as concentrated as the  1976 estimate  suggests. The largest four ex- 
porters account for 61 percent of export sales for wheat, and one must 
include the largest twenty firms to account for 90 percent of export 
sales.  Second, the  concentration  ratios for corn, soybeans, and all 
grains are lower than for wheat. Finally, concentration ratios for do- 
mestic  sales are lower  still. Caves and Pugel  (1982) present  similar 
evidence based on a survey of members of the North American Export 
Grain Association. Their evidence points to the largest firms handling 
a majority of “direct” export sales, while many smaller firms purchase 
grain from farmers to sell domestically or to the largest exporters, who 
then export it  (the latter type of  sale being classified as “indirect” 
exports). 




Export Sales  Year 
(Marketing Year  1974-75)  1977) 
Number of  Firms  Wheat  Corn  Soybeans  All Grains  All Grains 
Four largest  61.0%  42.0%  40.5%  48.6%  25.4% 
Eight largest  81.7%  63.8%  63.7%  68.6%  38.1% 
Twenty largest  89.2%  93.3%  90.8%  90.  I %  54.5% 
Source: Conklin 1982, 30-33. 96  Marie Thursby 
High concentration ratios are not necessarily  indicative of the ex- 
ercise of market power. In the short run, firms in a highly concentrated 
industry have the potential to exercise market power until entry can 
occur.  While the grain export industry is highly  concentrated, there 
has been considerable entry and exit in the industry over the last de- 
cade. The number of firms reporting export sales of  wheat increased 
40  percent  between  marketing  year  1974-75  and  1983-84,  and  the 
number of  firms exporting corn and  soybeans increased 30  percent 
over the same period.'O As reported in  Caves and Pugel (1982), one of 
the largest firms exited the industry during that period (Cook). 
Evidence of price discrimination by  exporting firms in the absence 
of government subsidies would indicate market power. Except in the 
limiting case (n = h  = a~)  of the quasi-competitive model, the analysis 
in  this chapter assumes firms have the ability to  price  discriminate 
between the home and foreign market. Although the difference between 
the export and domestic consumer price in any of the models may be 
positive or negative,  all of the models predict a positive correlation 
between  this difference and export volume for zero or constant dis- 
tribution cost per unit. With perfect competition and constant distri- 
bution cost, export volume and this price difference are unrelated. It 
is, therefore, possible to test for market power and the ability to price 
discriminate by testing for a positive relation between export volume 
and the difference between export and domestic prices. 
To  prove the ability of firms to price discriminate, one needs data 
for export and wholesale prices for the same type and grade of exports, 
net of distribution  costs. I have export and wholesale prices for the 
same grade of wheat for hard red winter (hrw) and dark northern spring 
(dns) wheat for 1962/63-1983/84.  Export and wholesale price data for 
the same period are also available for corn and soybeans."  Unfortu- 
nately data for distribution  cost are not available, so any analysis of 
the relation between the export-wholesale price differential and export 
volume must be interpreted in light of potential effects this cost might 
have. For example, it would be possible in the framework of the models 
presented here for the export-domestic consumer price difference to 
be negatively correlated if there were significant economies of scale in 
distribution. Caves and Pugel (1982) present evidence of  such econ- 
omies of  scale in distribution as part of their explanation for the high 
concentration of the U.S. grain export industry. 
Table 4.5 presents  the results of  eight regressions  of  the export- 
wholesale price differential on export volume. The first four columns 
describe  the  results for the  period  1962/63- 1983/84. Column  labels 
denote the commodity for which the price differential is the dependent 
variable. All data are yearly, and prices are in real terms. Because the 
price differential could be affected by  shifts in  underlying consumer 97  Strategic Models and State Trading 
Table 4.5  U.S. Export-Wholesale Price Differential 
1962/63- 1983184 
Variables  Wheat (hrw)  Wheat (dns)  Corn  Soybeans 
Constant  -0.201 
(- .60) 
Volume  0.025 
(.76) 
Trend  0.014 
(.70) 
Trend*volume  -0.001 
(~ .56) 
Number firms  n.a. 
Dummy  -0.678**" 
( -  6.16) 
R*  0.938 
-0.309 











-  ,167 





-  ,000 
(- .58) 
n.a. 
-  .383*h 














Variables  Wheat (hrw)  Wheat (dns)  Corn  Soybeans 
Constant  -  .0924** 
( -6.55) 
Volume  0.093 *  * 
Trend  0.153** 
(5.41) 
(6.55) 
Trend*volume  -0.013** 
(- 7.05) 
Number firms  -  0.000 
( -  .03) 
Dummy  n.a. 
R2  ,925 












~  1.284 

















-  ,0002 
(- .24) 




Sources:  For wheat, export volume and  export prices  are from  International Wheat 
Council, various  issues; wholesale prices  are from  USDA,  various issues of  Wheut 
Situation and Wheut Situution und Outlook. For corn and soybeans, export prices and 
volume and wholesale  prices are from USDA  1986. All prices are deflated by the con- 
sumer price index taken from USDA  1986. 
Notes: Export price for hard  red winter wheat is for no. 2,  13  percent protein, f.0.b. 
Gulf. Export price for dark northern spring wheat is the average of f.0.b. Gulf and Pacific 
prices for 14 percent protein. Wholesale prices for wheat are "prices to millers"  for the 
same types of wheat and protein content. The wholesale price for hard red winter wheat 
is  the Kansas  price, and  the wholesale price  for dark  northern  spring wheat is  the 
Minnesota price. Export prices for corn and soybeans are f.0.b. Gulf, and wholesale 
prices are Chicago prices for no. 2 yellow corn and no.  1  yellow soybeans. 
"Dummy for export subsidy through 1972. 
hDummy for demand shift in 1973. 
'Significant  at 10  percent level. 
**Significant  at 5 percent level. 98  Mane Thursby 
demand and producer supply or changes in distribution cost, I include 
time as a regressor to capture any systematic changes in these excluded 
variables. Since the relation between the price differential and export 
volume can be affected by economies of scale in distribution and export 
volume has grown over time, I also include time multiplied by export 
volume. Finally, for the years 1962/63- 1972/73, the United States sub- 
sidized wheat exports, so I include a dummy equal to one in the subsidy 
years and zero in nonsubsidy years. Neither corn nor soybeans were 
subsidized; however, corn exports showed a dramatic shift in  1972- 
73, so a dummy equal to one is included for that and subsequent years. 
With the exception of wheat, the explanatory power of these regres- 
sions is low. Moreover, the wheat regressions are consistent with the 
export subsidy being the major determinant of any price differential. 
The wheat  subsidy  dummy is  the  only  variable  significant at  the  5 
percent level in any of the regressions. Export volume and trend*volume 
are significant at the 10 percent level only in the case of dns wheat. 
The last four columns in table 4.5 refer to results of a slightly different 
regression for the period 1974175-1983/84.  For each of the years in the 
period, data are available for the number of  firms reporting export 
sales. For the same reasons that concentration ratios are a poor measure 
of market power, the number of firms need not be indicative of either 
the presence or absence of market power. Nonetheless, there was sub- 
stantial entry during this period, so I include the number of firms as a 
regressor. If the industry were purely competitive thete should be no 
relation between the price differential and the number of  firms. The 
dummy variables are not applicable to this period.I2 
Notice first the marked difference between the explanatory power 
of  the wheat  regressions  and those for the other grains. While the 
coefficient of export volume is positive in all cases, it is significant at 
the 5 percent level only for wheat (the significance level for corn is 21 
percent). Recalling that the four-firm concentration ratio for wheat is 
noticeably higher than that for the other two, these results are at least 
suggestive of  the exercise of market power in wheat.  In none of  the 
regressions,  however,  is  the  coefficient  for  the  number  of  firms 
significant. 
Note that because the regressions include trend*volume, the partial 
effects of volume and trend are functions of both their coefficients and 
the coefficient of trend'volume.  Thus for the wheat regressions, I report 
the partial effects of  volume and trend for each year in table 4.6. As 
expected, in the regressions for 1962/63-1983/84 the partial effects are 
rarely significant. For 1974/75- 1983/84, however, the partial effects of 
volume and trend are often significant. The partial effect of volume on 
the price differential is positive until the late 1970s and becomes neg- 
ative in the 1980s. The partial effect of  trend on the differential goes 99  Strategic Models and State Trading 
Table 4.6  Partial Effects of  Export Volume and Trend on U.S.  Export- 
Wholesale Price Differential for Wheat 
Year  Export  t-Statistic  Trend  t-Statistic 
1962/63- 1983/84 (hrw) 
62  0.024 
63  0.023 
64  0.022 
65  0.021 
66  0.02 
67  0.019 
68  0.018 
69  0.017 
70  0.016 
71  0.0149 
72  0.0139 
73  0.0129 
74  0.01 I9 
75  0.0109 
76  0.0099 
77  0.0089 
78  0.0079 
79  0.0069 
80  0.0059 
81  0.0049 
82  0.0039 
83  0.0028 
1962/63- 1983/84 (dns) 
62  0.055  * 
63  0.0518* 
64  0.0486* 
65  0.0454* 
66  0.0422 
67  0.039 
68  0.0358 
69  0.0326 
70  0.0294 
71  0.0262 
72  0.023 
73  0.0198 
74  0.0166 
75  0.0134 
76  0.0102 
77  0.007 
78  0.0038 
79  0.0006 
80  -  0.0026 
81  -0.0058 
82  -0.0091 









































-  0. I 805 
-  0.3828 



































-  0.0036 
-0.0003 
-  0.0041 
0.0019 
-0.0041 
























-  0.0969 













-  0.4936 
-  0.3849 
-0.0374 
-  0.4423 
0.2143 
-  0.4356 
-0.5454 
-0.941  I 
~  1.2772 
-  I .5085 
-  1.132 
-  1.0685 100  Marie Thursby 
Table 4.6  (continued) 
Year  Export  t-Statistic  Trend  t-Statistic 
1974175- 1983184 (hrw) 
74  0.080  1 ** 
75  0.0674* * 
76  0.0547* * 
77  0.0421** 
78  0.0294** 
79  0.0167 
80  0.0041 
81  -  0.0086 
82  -  0.02 I3* 
83  -  0.0339** 
1974/75- 1983184 (dns) 
74  0.0434* 
75  0.0342 
76  0.0249 
77  0.0156 
78  0.0063 
79  -0.003 
80  -0.0122 
81  -  0.02 15 
82  -  0.0308* 








-  0.8507 








-  1.0217 
-  1.8094 
-  2.5288 
-3.1279 





-  0.0176** 
-  0.0432** 




-  0.0256** 
-  0.008 
-  0.0254** 
-0.0287** 
-0.0428** 
-  0.0615** 
-0.0862** 
-  0.0521 ** 







-  5.6039 
-  6.702 
-4.5808 
-  4.07 
-  1.7938 




-  6.1301 
-  6.7732 
-  6.3774 
-  6.6736 
-6.5413 
*Significant at the 10  percent level. 
**Significant at the 5  percent level. 
from positive to negative in the case of hrw wheat, while it is consis- 
tently negative for dns wheat. 
There are a number of interpretations one could give to the volume 
and trend results for 1974/75-1983/84.  One interpretation is that ex- 
porting firms have market power and that the trend term reflects econ- 
omies of  scale  in distribution.  If  economies of  scale  became more 
important toward the end of the period, the partial effect of volume 
would become negative over time.  Another interpretation is that the 
industry is relatively competitive, with entry occurring over the period 
in  response to short-run profits of the mid-1970s. The latter interpre- 
tation is consistent with evidence of Caves (1978), who found a sig- 
nificant  relation  between profit  margins and volume  of  sales for all 
grains for the year 1973-74.  For a more extended period, he found a 
significant relation only for soybeans. 
In summary, the evidence presented here is consistent with that of 
others (Caves 1978; Caves and Pugel 1982; Conklin 1982; and USGAO 101  Strategic Models and State Trading 
1982). Grain exporting is highly concentrated because of economies of 
scale in distribution, but barriers to entry in U.S. grain marketing are 
not prohibitive. Large exporting firms may be in a position to exercise 
market power in the short run, and they may have done so in the mid- 
1970s. Nonetheless, the industry cannot be characterized as a  pure 
monopol  y-monopsony. 
This result  is important in  light of my  results  in  section 4.3. The 
optimal trade policy for the home government changes from an export 
subsidy with monopoly-monopsony to an export tax with two exporting 
firms.  Whether or not  U.S. exporting firms  have  market power,  it 
appears that the appropriate government policy  to maximize  social 
welfare would be an export tax. 
4.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this  chapter I  examined  several  theoretical  models  capable of 
showing how state trading and competition in private export trade affect 
strategic use of  trade policy. Recent literature in this area has focused 
on oligopolistic industries in which private firms maximize profits and 
are unregulated. In my analysis, if domestic taxhbsidy policy can be 
used in conjunction with trade policy, optimal trade policy is qualita- 
tively the same whether an export agent maximizes producer returns 
or profits. If, however, governments regulate domestic consumer prices, 
appropriate trade policy may be quite different depending on the mar- 
keting agent’s objective.I3 I find that the exports of a regulated mar- 
keting board might be optimally taxed by its government, whereas a 
government would optimally subsidize exports of a monopolist exporter. 
I also find that when a marketing board and a private export industry 
composed of one or more firms compete as Cournot rivals, the govern- 
ment of the country with the private industry would subsidize exports 
only when marketing is done by a monopolist. In light of this result, the 
empirical analysis of the United States grain industry suggests export 
subsidies would not be welfare improving from a national point of view. 
Based on the ability of exporters to price discriminate between domestic 
and export sales, I find no evidence of the exercise of market power in 
corn and soybean markets. For the period  1974/75-1983/84,  I find lim- 
ited  support for price discrimination in wheat markets. Nonetheless, 
during this period at least forty-one firms recorded export sales of wheat, 
so the policy prescription of the theoretical model for this case would 
be an export tax. 
Several issues not addressed here are potentially interesting.  First, 
the importing country in these models also has market power. Brander 
and Spencer (1984, 1985) have examined optimal policy of an importing 
country in the face of imperfect competition. Evidence for wheat trade 102  Marie Thursby 
suggests two ways optimal import policy might be approached. Since 
over 80 percent of wheat imports is purchased by state traders (recall 
table 4.3), it would be interesting to examine how the objective of the 
state importing agency affects policies and market outcomes. The other 
interesting approach would be to allow the importer to produce (and 
perhaps export) the good. The motivation for this complication comes 
from the prominent role of  the EEC in agricultural markets and trade 
negotiations. Carter and Schmitz (1979) have examined the EEC’s vari- 
able levy as an optimal tariff, but it is clear that EEC intervention in 
agricultural  markets comes from more than a simple optimum tariff 
calculation (Brown 1986; Gardner 1986; Hayes and Schmitz 1986; and 
Sarris 1986). 
Finally, in my models the marketing board maximized joint producer 
returns and its government maximized social welfare. In practice, mar- 
keting boards and governments also have price stability goals. Since it 
is well known that policy implications in strategic models are sensitive 
to whether rivals compete in  output or price (Eaton and Grossman 
1986), one would expect policies to differ if agents competed in prices 
and if  objectives pertained to stability of these prices. 
Notes 
Thanks are due to Robert Baldwin, Alan Deardorff, Tom Grennes, Richard 
Jensen, Paul Johnson, Alex McCalla, James Markusen, Steve Salant, Robert 
Stern, and Jerry Thursby for insightful suggestions, and Aileen Thompson for 
research assistance. 
I. McCalla and Schmitz 1982 and studies in McCalla and Josling 1981  argue 
that market outcomes will  vary depending  on the source of  the imperfect 
competition. 
2. Export subsidies for primary products are to be avoided when they lead 
to a more than “equitable”  share of the market, whereas countries are not to 
grant subsidies  (either  direct or indirect)  that lead  to export prices  below 
domestic prices in the case of nonprimary products. 
3. See Markusen 1984 for an analysis of marketing boards that maximize 
profits. 
4. As shown by Dixit  1984, this  choice is  equivalent to the government 
choosing  domestic and export sales to  maximize welfare. To see this, substitute 
r, v, and s, given by equations (12)--(14), into equations (3) and (4). The mo- 
nopolist’s first-order conditions are then equivalent  to those that would emerge 
if  the government were to choose x  and y to maximize equation (9): 
6wJ6y  = a - by -  f  - k(y + x) = 0, and 
6~/6x  = a, - 2h,,x - b,,, [@(XI  + x@’(x)] -  f  -  k(y + X)  = 0. 
5. It is, of course, also possible to employ only a production and consumption 
subsidyhax, but exposition would be more difficult. 103  Strategic Models and State Trading 
6.  I  abstract from issues relating to entry of competitive producers. This 
issue arises because the board is acting to maximize their joint returns. Entry 
in response to an increase in returns would, in turn, affect the supply curve 
facing the board in our analysis. In  practice, production quotas are used for 
this purpose, and the reader is referred to Hoos 1979. 
7.  These percentages were calculated from data in International Wheat Coun- 
cil, International  Wheat Statistics, and may be off  by  +I-  2 percent or 3 
percent in any year. Nevertheless, the market shares have been relatively stable 
over the past twenty years. 
8. See McCalla and Schmitz 1982, appendix 3, 291-93,  for a list  of  state 
trading boards and agencies. 
9. Essentially there are more nonzero bilateral trade flows for wheat than a 
perfectly competitive spatial equilibrium model would predict. An alternative 
approach to predicting these flows would be to treat wheat as a differentiated 
product (Johnson, Grennes, and Thursby 1979). 
10. Information was provided by the Export Sales Reporting Division of the 
Foreign Agricultural Service. In marketing year 1974-75  there were 41  firms 
reporting exports of wheat, 56 firms reporting corn exports, and 39 reporting 
soybean exports. In 1983-84  there were 61  firms reporting exports of wheat, 
76 firms reporting corn exports, and 53 reporting soybean exports. 
1 I. Data for wheat  are available by  protein content, while price data are 
available only for no. 2 yellow corn and no. 1  yellow soybeans. The difference 
lies in the fact that, strictly speaking, wheat is not homogeneous and is de- 
manded for different end uses, while corn and soybean are not. See Johnson, 
Grennes, and Thursby 1979 on this point. 
12. It can be argued that credit policies are effective subsidies, but neither 
my models nor my empirical work incorporate these. 
13. If the private monopolist, for example, were regulated in the same man- 
ner, a higher export subsidy than otherwise would be optimal. 
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Comment  Kala Krishna 
This  chapter  addresses  an interesting question  about optimal  trade 
policy for agriculture.  It focuses on the possible distortions that are 
created  by  having monopsonistic  buyers, a situation that frequently 
arises in agriculture, when these buyers are also oligopolistic sellers in 
the world market. The chapter has two components, a theoretical part 
and an empirical part. I confine my comments to the theoretical part 
since my comparative advantage seems to lie in this direction. 
The model of the chapter has four agents-the  domestic and foreign 
sellers of the product and the two governments. Each firm sells at home 
and in  a third market, and buys its product from competitive sellers. 
In addition, Thursby has the two governments setting three variables 
each-the  consumption, production, and export subsidy/tax. Thus the 
firms have two variables  each, the amount to sell at home and the 
amount to sell on the third market, and each government has three 
variables to set. The collection of  first-order conditions looks formi- 
dable.  However  some clever manipulation  yields  results on overall 
optimal policy for the case where firms play a Cournot game and face 
linear demand and supply functions, and governments precommit to 
policies. 
Kala Krishna is assistant professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty 
research fellow of  the National  Bureau of  Economic Research. 106  Marie Thursby 
The chapter considers two kinds of firms-a  monopsonist firm whose 
objective is to maximize its profits and a marketing board whose ob- 
jective is to maximize the earnings of its suppliers. This is well worth 
doing  since  these  are  commonly  found  institutions  in  agricultural 
markets. 
The chapter also considers the effects of having a regulated board 
that can only price at marginal  cost at home, and of  more firms, in 
sections 4.2 and 4.3. In section 4.2 the optimal policy, when the market 
is regulated  and c'*y,'  is  small, is  that of a subsidy on exports. In 
section 4.3 Thursby shows that if the number of home firms rises (above 
two) the optimal policy is to tax exports. 
Although the results are suggestive, the weakest point of the chapter 
is that the results are derived for very special models, those of Cournot 
quantity-setting behavior with linear demand and supply functions. This 
approach does not cast enough light on the basic structure of the prob- 
lem. For example, with a domestic monopsonist, there seem to be three 
basic roles for policy  since welfare equals the sum of net profits of 
government and producers, consumer surplus and competitive pro- 
ducer's surplus. The first role for policy is to fix the strategic wedge a 
la  Eaton and Grossman (1986) which might be called a strategic dis- 
tortion. With a Cournot duopoly model this always calls for an export 
subsidy. The second role is to fix the consumption distortion due to 
monopoly power in the home market. This calls for a subsidy on do- 
mestic consumption as the monopolist sells too little in the home mar- 
ket. The third role is to fix the distortion due to the domestic producer's 
role as a monopsonist buyer. This causes too little to be produced by 
the competitive suppliers and creates a production  distortion, calling 
for a production  subsidy. However, since a production  subsidyitax is 
equivalent to an appropriate consumption taxisubsidy and export taxi 
subsidy combination, only the latter two need be set appropriately. 
The first and third distortions call for an export subsidy, while the 
second for a consumption subsidy in the Cournot case with  a home 
monopsonist. It is not clear that the export subsidy will be optimal if, 
for example, firms play a price game when the first distortion will call 
for a tax. Moreover, when there is a producer-surplus-maximizing mar- 
keting board, the production  distortion would seem to vanish so that 
the case for an export subsidy would be further weakened. The reg- 
ulated marketing board can also be similarly interpreted. In this case 
the consumption distortion would vanish due to regulation so that the 
case for a consumption subsidy would  be weakened. However, the 
regulation would also affect other distortions as the home market gets 
linked by the regulation to the third market. 
Finally, the result of section 4.3, where the number of firms grows, 
seems closely related to the existing literature.  Having more firms at 107  Strategic Models and State Trading 
home creates  an externality since each does not count the other’s profits 
and so competition is excessive. A tax on exports is then called for. 
It would definitely be worthwhile to pursue this line of research and 
see whether the results generalize as suggested here. It would, in par- 
ticular, be desirable to find a targeting principle for oligopolistic markets 
analogous to the analysis developed by  Bhagwati, Ramaswamy,  and 
Srinivasan which has been widely applied in the traditional trade lit- 
erature. It is to be hoped that such work will be forthcoming since this 
is such an important area, and especially since agriculture  has been 
relatively free from GATT laws and is an item of some importance in 
the upcoming Uruguay Round. 
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